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Abstract
Typically, shareholders are not sure whether boards act in their interest, or have been
captured by management. They are also less well informed than boards about firm invest-
ment opportunities and operating conditions. We develop a model, consistent with these
observations, in which discretionary compensation payments to managers might increase
firm value or might simply enrich managers at the expense of shareholders. After observ-
ing the board’s compensation and investment policies, shareholders update the probability
that the board is captured using Bayes rule. Shareholders are “outraged” if this updated
probability is sufficiently large. Outrage is costly for the board. Shareholder democracy,
by enabling outrage to constrain board actions, typically lowers firm value relative either
to governance regimes that insulate boards from shareholder outrage, or regimes that ban
discretionary compensation altogether.
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1 Introduction
Shareholder influence on the level and structure of compensation of company executives is now
more important than ever before. Moreover, a significant driver of this increased influence is
public policy. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. gives shareholders in public com-
panies “Say-on-pay,” that is, the right to cast non-binding votes each year on executive pay
packages. Judged from the perspective of this legislation, it appears that the public policy mak-
ers believe that firm efficiency will be increased by permitting unbiased, but poorly informed,
outside shareholders to evaluate specific corporate decisions and, based on their evaluations,
pressure better informed but also possibly biased insiders. However, in analogous situations,
public policy does not always apply this logic. Judges, for example, act as agents of citizens
by interpreting laws and applying the laws to specific cases. Corrupt judges may act in the
interest of favored litigants and defendants rather than citizens. However, this analog of Say-
on-pay in the case of the judge/citizen relationship—judicial recall by popular vote—has not
been adopted by the most important jurisdictions, e.g., the U.S federal court system, and, where
it has been adopted, it is rarely used.
The argument against judicial recall is based on the idea that the threat of recall itself will
distort the judicial decision by inducing judges to make their ruling consistent with the per-
spectives of poorly informed voters. An analogous argument can be made for corporate boards.
Contested shareholder votes on director policies imposes costs on directors.1 Shareholder pref-
erences over policies are frequently conditioned on general non-firm specific policy guidelines,
e.g., institutional investors voting in accordance with “one size fits all” guidelines of proxy
advisory firms.2 Given shareholders’ limited information, the reliance on guidelines might be
rational for them, but not optimal, because of the private and firm-specific information pos-
sessed by directors. Subjecting some policy choices of informed, but possibly compromised,
1Cai et al. (2009) find that “withhold” recommendations by Institutional Shareholder services (ISS), one of
the worlds leading proxy advisory firms, leads to significantly lower voting support for directors. While directors
typically receive more than 90 percent of votes in uncontested director elections, negative shareholder votes or
shareholder activism can impose costs on directors through negative publicity or public embarrassment. Lower
votes are associated with meaningful changes in CEO turnover, governance changes, and changes in executive
compensation. Fischer et al. (2009) report similar findings. Del Guercio et al. (2008) find that “ just vote no”
campaigns (led by activist shareholders to have as many votes withheld as possible in director elections) are
associated with improved performance and CEO turnover. The authors find that these changes occur when the
campaigns focus on broad performance and strategy issues, as opposed to being narrowly focused on corporate
governance issues, such as compensation. In a study of non-US firms, Iliev et al. (2015) find that dissent voting is
more likely when there is concern for expropriation, and leads to more director turnover.
2Several papers show that ISS recommendations are significantly related to shareholder voting outcomes—see,
for example, Ertimur et al. (2013) and Larcker et al. (2014). Iliev and Lowry (2015) report that over 25 percent of
mutual funds vote on the basis of the recommendations of ISS.
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boards to pressure from less well informed outside shareholders generates incentives for these
boards to manage their reputation with outsiders by using their private information to manipu-
late other policy levers. Such manipulations can be costly. In fact, in principal–agent models,
where a more informed agent is assessed by a less informed principal, reputation management
typically leads to distortionary manipulations (Narayanan, 1985; Stein, 1988).
The main insight of this paper is that, because of distortionary manipulation, the cost of
subjecting boards to external evaluation by less well informed outside shareholders can easily
outweigh the benefits. Distortionary manipulation is most costly in precisely those circum-
stances where advocates of shareholder democracy claim it is most needed, i.e., when boards
are likely to be management oriented. At the same time, we do identify conditions, which
depend on the specific firm characteristics, under which democracy can benefit shareholders.
Thus, we predict that imposing mandatory shareholder democratic influence over specific man-
agerial compensation decisions will have decidedly mixed effects on shareholder welfare. Such
impositions will produce inferior results to reforms that tune the level of outside shareholders’
influence over compensation policy to the specific characteristics of their firms.
Consistent with these observations, the evidence on the wealth effects of shareholder pres-
sure on compensation policy is mixed. Larcker et al. (2014) find that companies that amend
their executive compensation plans to avoid a negative recommendation from proxy advisory
firms exhibit statistically significant negative stock price returns. Ertimur et al. (2013) find no
market reaction to announcements of changes in compensation plans in response to negative
recommendations by proxy advisory firms. Cai and Walkling (2011) examine market reac-
tions to the passage of the 2007 Say-on-pay Bill. They document average positive stock price
reactions to the passage of the Say-on-pay Bill, but negative stock price reactions in some sub-
samples. Ferri and Maber (2013) find positive stock price reactions to the announcement of
Say-on-pay regulation, especially among firms with “excess pay” and poor performance.
One of the most controversial issues in the pay debate is discretionary pay—payments in
excess of base salary not based on explicit performance measures. Discretionary compensation
payments are pervasive (De Angelis and Grinstein, 2012). Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue
that management oriented boards use discretionary compensation to enrich managers at the
expense of shareholders. In contrast, Inderst and Mueller (2010) and Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2008) develop models in which discretionary severance pay is an efficient means to induce
managers to reveal private information.
As in Inderst and Mueller (2010) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), we also model dis-
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cretionary compensation grants as revelation mechanisms. However, our focus is not on dis-
cretionary compensation per se but rather on the scope of the authority of the board to grant
such compensation. We show that ex post evaluations of board compensation policy by share-
holders can only increase firm value in very special circumstances. Thus, our analysis casts
significant doubt on the proposition that mandating increased shareholder influence over board
discretionary compensation policy for all firms will increase shareholder welfare.
In our setting, both shareholder oriented boards and manager oriented boards use discre-
tionary compensation, but for very different reasons. While shareholder oriented boards use
discretionary compensation to induce managers to reveal information regarding project NPV,
manager oriented boards use it to enrich management. Shareholder democracy, by introduc-
ing reputational considerations into the board’s calculus, leads management oriented boards
to deviate even further from shareholder optimal policies in order to manipulate shareholder
perceptions.
The key driver of our analysis is the feature that shareholders are less informed than boards
and managers along many dimensions. Shareholders are unsure about (a) whether the project’s
NPV is positive, and (b) whether the project is in the manager’s “comfort zone,” and (c) whether
the board is loyal to shareholders or management.
Shareholders’ information about project NPV is restricted to an imprecise signal of project
value. Shareholders are also unsure of whether the project is in the manager’s comfort zone. If
the project is outside the manager’s comfort zone, the manager is conflicted, in which case, the
manager receives a non-pecuniary “quiet-life” private benefit if the project is rejected.3 Finally,
shareholders are unsure of board loyalty, i.e., whether the board is fixing compensation policy
to maximize shareholder payoffs or to maximize the payoff to the manager. Thus, in contrast
to, for example, Song and Thakor (2006), in our model the board actions affect the shareholder
assessments of board loyalty rather than ability. We also assume, in contrast to Fisman et al.
(2014), these shareholder assessments to be Bayes rational.4
As in most models of board/shareholder interaction, boards have better information than
3Of course, in some sense, shareholder and manager preferences are always in conflict with respect to com-
pensation because managers always prefer higher compensation. Thus, even when the manager is not “conflicted”
in our sense, the manager will still prefer to receive compensation in excess of the shareholder optimal level and,
thus, through compensation policy, disloyal boards can favor even non-conflicted managers. This is an important
feature of our model.
4In Levit and Malenko (2016), board members vote for or against management to create a reputation for
shareholder or manager friendliness which affects the likelihood of new directorial appointments. A key difference
is that in their model, even a reputation for manager friendliness could be rewarded in the labor market due to
strategic complementaries in governance. In contrast, our focus is very much on shareholder activism and outrage
targeted at manager friendly boards.
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shareholders. Obviously, they know to whom they are loyal. They also understand the man-
ager’s motivations and thus know whether the manager is conflicted.5 In addition, boards have
more precise information about the project’s NPV than shareholders. However, even the boards’
information about project NPV is imperfect. The only agent that has perfect information about
board loyalty, managerial preferences, and project NPV, is the manager. Our analysis of share-
holder democracy focuses on how boards use their informational advantage over sharehold-
ers to manage their reputation for loyalty. In this respect, our model differs from models of
board/manager/shareholder interaction where shareholders (Stein, 1988) or managers (Cohn
and Rajan, 2013) form reputations.
In our setting, discretionary pay extracts project information from the manager in the fol-
lowing way. When the project NPV is positive, it is in the interest of the shareholders to accept
the project. When the manager is conflicted, however, accepting the project will eliminate the
manager’s quiet-life benefit. Thus, absent any inducement, when the NPV of the project is
positive, the conflicted manager has no incentive to report the NPV truthfully. However, when
the manager is paid an amount equal to his quiet-life benefit if (and only if) he reports the
NPV to be positive, the manager will report truthfully. Such compensation will not increase
the welfare of the conflicted manager since it exchanges a non-pecuniary quiet life benefit for
a monetary payment of equal value. Thus, in our setting, when the manager is conflicted, dis-
cretionary payments are an optimal contracting mechanism. However, if the manager is not
conflicted, discretionary payments are not required to induce revelation. For a non-conflicted
manager, discretionary payments are a pure windfall that entails no loss of private benefits.
Thus, if offered discretionary compensation, non-conflicted managers will readily accept the
compensation and the project will thus be accepted regardless of its NPV.
Hence, managers and management oriented boards prefer offering discretionary compen-
sation when managers are not conflicted, while shareholders and shareholder oriented boards
prefer offering discretionary compensation when managers are conflicted. A preference for of-
fering discretionary compensation is not per se informative about the orientation of the board.
Both manager and shareholder boards prefer offering discretionary compensation under some,
albeit very different, conditions.
We compare the shareholder-welfare consequences of ex post shareholder pressure on boards
with two types of ex ante charter-based commitment policies: (i) full delegation, which involves
5Our results depend on the board having superior information to outside shareholders regarding managerial
preferences. However, the results are robust to alternative specifications of this advantage. See Online Supple-
ment A for further discussion.
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delegating discretionary pay policy to the board and insulating the board from shareholder pres-
sure (e.g., via staggered boards or poison pills), and (ii) charter restriction, which bans discre-
tionary pay completely. Under full delegation, we assume that as long as the board actions do
not reveal, with certainty, that the board is disloyal, the board is insulated from shareholder
sanction. Under full delegation, when the manager is conflicted, discretionary compensation
can be used to elicit the manager’s private information about project NPV by both types of
board. However, when the manager is not conflicted, discretionary pay is not needed but can
be misused by manager oriented boards to enrich management. Under the commitment policy
of charter restriction, both the benefits from the appropriate use of discretionary compensation
and the costs of its misuse are forgone.
Finally, we consider a non-commitment policy—shareholder democracy. Under share-
holder democracy, the firm permits the board to fix compensation/investment policy but ex-
poses the board to ex post shareholder judgment. To model shareholder democracy, we assume
that shareholders have rational expectations, and combine their imperfect information regarding
firm prospects with their observations of board compensation and investment policy, to assess
the board. Shareholder suspicion refers to the shareholders’ imperfect posterior assessment
that the board is manager oriented. Suspicion affects governance through outrage. Outrage
is triggered if board policies are sufficiently suspicious, that is, they induce a sufficiently high
posterior probability that the board is manager oriented. Triggering outrage imposes very high
costs on the board. We assume that these costs are so high that the board never selects policies
that produce outrage. Thus, our model implements the idea of “outrage constraint” on man-
agement compensation that has been advanced in the popular, financial economics, and legal
literatures.6
In our model, discretionary compensation is less beneficial to shareholders when the ex-
pected project NPV is low. Thus, discretionary payment grants are most suspicious when the
ex post public signal observed by shareholders suggests low project NPV. Under shareholder
democracy, the outrage trigger can be violated and discretionary payment can be blocked when
the public signal is “low”, but discretionary payments might be possible when the signal is
“high.” Thus democracy, in contrast to the ex ante policies, can support signal contingent blocks
on discretionary compensation. If the public signal is informative regarding project NPV, signal
contingency might be valuable. By permitting discretionary compensation after the high signal,
6Clearly, assuming that outrage costs are so large that outrage acts as a constraint on board decision-making
is not the only reasonable model of how shareholder assessments affect board behavior. However, we prefer to
track the existing literature as closely as possible (Murphy, 2002; Krugman, 2002; Bolton et al., 2006). See Online
Supplement B for more discussion of these issues.
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when it is more likely to have legitimate use, but blocking it after the low signal, when it is less
likely to have such use, it appears that shareholder democracy can increase shareholder welfare
relative to both full delegation and charter restriction.
This line of reasoning would be entirely correct if the manager oriented board’s behavior
were not influenced by the reputational concerns entering the board’s decision making by share-
holder democracy. However, because of the board’s multidimensional information advantage
over shareholders, even the Bayes rational shareholders we model find it difficult to interpret
board behavior. The probability that discretionary compensation is granted is the “tell” that
generates shareholder suspicion. But boards can reduce this probability not only by reducing
inappropriate grants to non-conflicted managers but also by reducing appropriate grants to con-
flicted managers. Shareholders cannot distinguish between these two options. Disloyal boards
prefer the second option in order to protect the windfall it produces for managers. This choice,
which we term democratic distortion, is costly to shareholders.
Since the distortions due to democracy stem from the actions of the disloyal board, for these
costs to be small, the ex ante probability of board disloyalty must be sufficiently small. How-
ever, since the main benefit of democracy is to curb the misuse of discretionary pay by disloyal
boards, for these gains from democracy to be large, the ex ante probability of board disloyalty
must also be sufficiently large. At the same time, the public signal must be sufficiently informa-
tive for the value of signal contingency to outweigh the costs of democratic distortion. These
requirements together ensure that shareholder democracy only dominates full delegation and
charter restrictions for a very narrow range of circumstances Thus, our model suggests that, for
a subset of firms, democracy may well increase shareholder value, but for many it will lower
it. Hence, our analysis provides no support for the mandatory adoption of policies that favor
corporate democracy.
2 Ex ante governance through charter provisions
In this section we develop the basic framework of the analysis and analyze the two ex ante com-
mitment policies: full delegation (FD) and charter restriction (CR). In Section 3 we extend the
analysis of this section to allow for ex post shareholder intervention through corporate democ-
racy. We postpone the development of the assumptions required only for modeling democracy
to that section.
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2.1 Timing of events
There are three risk-neutral agents in the model: A professional manager who has no ownership
stake in the firm, a board of directors that decides on the investment and compensation policy of
the firm, and shareholders who determine the corporate charter and evaluate the board. There
are three dates, t = 0, t = 1, and t = 2. The information and actions available to the agents in
the model at these dates are detailed below and graphed in Figure 1.
2.1.1 Information
Date t = 0.
• Board type is determined: There are two types of boards—those that maximize shareholder
value and those that maximize the manager’s payoff. We call these types the shareholder
oriented board (SB) and manager oriented board (MB), respectively. Board type is known
by managers and the board, but not known by shareholders. Shareholders’ prior assessment
of the probability that the board is an MB is represented by δ ∈ (0,1).
Date t = 1.
• The state of the firm is revealed to the board and the manager: The firm is in one of three







• The state of the project is revealed to the manager: The net present value of the project
(henceforth NPV) can be either positive (state+NPV) or negative (state−NPV), and project
NPV in these states are, respectively, +1 or −1. In the G state, the probability of a positive
NPV project is θ ≥ 12 ; in the B state, the probability of a negative NPV project is θ ; in the
M state, the probability of either a positive or negative NPV project is 12 .
• The state of the manager is revealed to the board and the manager: The state of the manager
equals either P or NP. In state P, the project is outside the manager’s comfort zone and
undertaking the project results in the manager losing a quiet-life benefit of P, where 0 <
P < 1. Thus, in state P there is a potential conflict of interest between the manager and
the shareholders with respect to investment policy. In this case, we say that the manager is
conflicted. The probability that the manager is conflicted, i.e., the probability that the state
of the manager is P, equals β , β ∈ (0,1). With probability 1−β , the state of the manager is
NP. In the latter case, the manager does not lose any private benefit if the project is accepted,
and thus, ignoring the effect on compensation payments, the manager is indifferent to firm
investment policy. In this case, we say that the manager is not conflicted.
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• The public signal is observed by the board, the manager, and the shareholders: x, a public
signal correlated with the state of the firm, is realized. The signal can take two values, x2
and x1, where x2 > x1. In state G, the high signal, x2, is realized with probability 1; in state
M, the high signal, x2, and the low signal, x1, are realized with equal probability; and in
state B, the low signal, x1, is realized with probability 1.
Date t = 2. The project’s NPV, either +1 or −1, is realized.
Information:project NPV


































Figure 1: Information structure. The solid rectangles indicate shareholder information sets.
The dotted lines indicate board information sets. The manager has complete information.
A few of salient features of our information structure are worthy of note. First, note that the
state of the firm induces a probability distribution over the state of the project. Second, because
our information structure ensures that the unconditional NPV of the project is zero, and because
the state of the firm B and the low public signal x1 are both correlated with negative realizations
of NPV, the expected NPV of the project is negative conditioned on state of the firm B as well
as the low public signal, x1. Similarly, the expected NPV of the project is positive conditioned
on state of the firm G as well as the high public signal, x2. Conditioned on state of the firm M,
expected project NPV is zero. Regardless of shareholder and board expectations, however, there
is always a positive probability that the project’s actual NPV is positive or that it is negative.
Since the manager knows the actual NPV of the project, the shareholder can always gain from
acquiring the manager’s private information. Acquiring this information is not problematic
when the manager is not conflicted. However, when the manager is conflicted, acquiring this
information requires some mechanism for inducing the quiet life manager to reveal positive
information about the project and thus risk losing the quiet-life private benefit.
Third, the discretionary compensation problem we model is only interesting under our as-
sumptions that 0 < β < 1, i.e., when shareholders are uncertain as to whether the manager is
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conflicted or not. If the shareholders know whether the manager is conflicted, they would know
the shareholder value maximizing discretionary compensation policy. Given that the sharehold-
ers are always loyal to shareholder interests and boards are sometimes disloyal, shareholders
would have no incentive to delegate discretionary compensation policy to the board.
Fourth, our information structure provides all agents with some information yet, at the same
time, stipulates an information hierarchy. Managers know the most. They have perfect informa-
tion about their own preferences and the project prospects. Boards occupy an intermediate po-
sition. They know the manager’s preferences and the state of the firm, which is imperfectly but
positively correlated with project prospects. Shareholders observe only a public signal which
is imperfectly but positively correlated with the state of the firm, which itself is an imperfect
signal for project prospects. Some features of our model are adopted to make the analysis more
tractable, and relaxing these would not have any major implications for our results—e.g., it is
possible to incorporate imperfect but superior managerial information about project prospects
into the analysis. However, the board’s intermediate information position is essential for our re-
sults. If the board’s information set coincided with that of the manager, a shareholder oriented
board would never offer discretionary payments to the manager, as such payments increase
shareholder welfare only if they elicit information revelation. If the board’s information set
coincided with that of the shareholders, then shareholders would have no incentive to delegate
project selection and compensation decisions to the board, as the possibly disloyal board would
have no advantage over shareholders in making such decisions.
2.1.2 Actions
All actions occur at date 1. First the board decides whether or not to offer discretionary com-
pensation (if permitted by charter), or to simply reject or accept the project without offering
discretionary compensation. If discretionary compensation is offered, the manager decides
whether to accept discretionary compensation tied to the manager’s accept/reject decision. Af-
ter the shareholders observe the accept/reject decision for the project, the public signal, and any
discretionary payment to the manager, they form their posterior probability, δˆ , that the board is
management oriented. We call this probability shareholder suspicion.
2.2 Preferences and payoffs
Board preferences depend on the board’s type. An SB maximizes shareholder value, which is
the expected project NPV net of the expected discretionary payment to the manager. An MB
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maximizes the payoff to the manager.
The manager’s payoff equals expected discretionary compensation plus the expected private
benefits. Private benefits depend on whether the manager is conflicted and on whether the
project is accepted or rejected. If the manager is not-conflicted, the manager’s private benefit is
zero regardless of whether the project is accepted or rejected. If the manager is conflicted, the
manager receives a private benefit of P > 0 if the project is rejected and a private benefit of zero
if the project is accepted. We refer to P as the manager’s “quiet-life benefit.” We normalize the
manager’s reservation payoff to 0.
Although a large literature in corporate finance is concerned with how managerial prefer-
ences generate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, there is a surprising
lack of consensus on exactly how managerial preferences affect corporate policy. One influ-
ential view that has some empirical support is that managers prefer a “quiet life” and eschew
projects that are out of their comfort zone (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). This is the per-
spective we adopt. Another influential notion is that managers prefer “empire building” and
thus derive private benefits from investments, irrespective of whether the investments create
shareholder value (Williamson, 1964; Jensen, 1993).
Most of the results in this paper do not depend on which of these two assumptions on
managerial preferences is appropriate. If the quiet life assumption is appropriate, the manager-
preferred action is to reject the project irrespective of its NPV. On the other hand, if the empire-
building assumption is appropriate, the manager-preferred action is to accept the project irre-
spective of its NPV. The results in our analysis that do depend on the nature of managerial
investment preferences are those that compare behavior after the high and low signals. For such
results, we will later discuss the nature of the dependence, and its empirical implications.
2.3 Discretionary pay
Discretionary pay delegates the project accept/reject decision to the manager but links the man-
ager’s compensation to the manager’s decision. One “trivial” discretionary compensation pack-
age that is always feasible because it involves no discretionary payments to the manager is
the “zero-discretionary pay” policy. Under this policy, the project accept/reject decision is
delegated to the manager and the manager receives zero discretionary compensation regard-
less of the manager’s accept/reject decision. To avoid the somewhat awkward locution “zero-
discretionary pay” we describe the policy of offering zero-discretionary pay and letting the
manager make the project accept/reject decision simply as “delegating” investment policy to
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the manager, and we restrict the usage of the term “discretionary compensation” to cases where
positive payments are offered to the manager.
Absent charter restrictions, in the conflicted state, the manager’s information regarding the
state of the project can be elicited by means of the following direct mechanism: If the manager
reports that the project has negative NPV, then he receives 0 and the project is rejected; if the
manager reports that the project has positive NPV, the project is accepted and the manager
receives a discretionary payment, Dc. If Dc = P, this revelation mechanism will induce the
manager to reveal the project NPV truthfully because the value the payment equals the quiet
life benefit. Any payment in excess of P enriches managers at the expense of shareholders
and will lead the manager to report that the project is positive NPV regardless of his private
information signal. No payment smaller than P will elicit revelation of positive NPV investment
opportunities. Thus, if the shareholder oriented board pays discretionary compensation, it will
always offer Dc = P and when the manager accepts this offer, the project will be accepted.
In practice, it may be difficult to formally incorporate a simple direct mechanism such as
the one described above as part of a managerial compensation contract, since this would re-
quire verifiability of the state of the manager and the manager’s report. However, the outcome
of the direct mechanism can be implemented by the following indirect mechanism: If and only
if the conflicted state is realized, the manager is offered the following compensation package:
either accept a discretionary payment of Dc = P and accept the project, or reject the project and
receive 0. Under this package, it is incentive compatible for the manager to accept the discre-
tionary compensation and implement the project if the project is positive NPV, and reject the
project and the discretionary payment if the project is negative NPV.7 Note also that, amongst
all discretionary mechanisms that induce revelation, this indirect mechanism is optimal from
the shareholder’s perspective as it provides a conflicted, and only conflicted, manager with the
minimal benefit required to induce revelation, P. Other forms of discretionary compensation
might also be optimal, e.g., discretionary stock grants, as long as they also provide the conflicted
manager with an expected increase in compensation value equal to P conditioned on accepting
the project. But such alternative forms of discretionary compensation are never strictly more
efficient from the shareholders’ perspective.
Of course, the firm need not use a discretionary mechanism at all. Shareholders could ex
ante, at date zero, vote to endow the manager with an ownership stake in the firm sufficiently
large for the manager to internalize enough of the NPV increase generated by undertaking the
7We assume the manager has limited liability, and cannot be made to pay P to reject the project.
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project. In this scenario, even when the manager is conflicted, the manager would still gain
from undertaking positive NPV investments. If firms adopt such ex ante policies, then offering
ex post discretionary compensation is never in the interest of the shareholders. In this case,
our model and other models of discretionary compensation (e.g., Inderst and Mueller, 2010;
Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008) are moot as they model solutions to an ex post problem that has
already been resolved by ex ante commitment. Strictly speaking, the choice between ex ante
commitment and ex post discretionary compensation is outside the scope of this paper as we
do not model ex ante compensation policy. However, it is easy to see that ex ante commitment
is not always optimal—ex ante commitment requires providing the manager with an owner-
ship stake or compensation plan that increases managerial welfare by at least P if the project is
undertaken. Thus, the cost of ex ante commitment to shareholders is at least P. Ex ante commit-
ment only benefits shareholders when the manager is conflicted, which occurs with probability
β . As β → 0, the benefit of ex ante commitment converges to 0 while its cost, P, remains
positive. Thus, for β sufficiently small, discretionary policies dominate ex ante commitment.
We follow the indirect mechanism interpretation of the discretionary compensation provided
above. Thus, when discretionary compensation is offered, the manager chooses whether to ac-
cept or reject the project and the discretionary payment is linked to project acceptance. Thus,
if the board offers discretionary compensation, or delegates, the manager makes the project
accept/reject decision. Otherwise, the board dictates investment and compensation policy.8
Absent the incentives generated by reputational concerns introduced later when we model cor-
porate democracy, we assume that the board and manager make efficient choices, i.e., when
choosing between alternatives over which they are indifferent, the manager and the MB choose
polices that maximize shareholder welfare; similarly, the SB, when choosing over polices over
which it is indifferent, chooses policies that maximize managerial welfare.
Calling the indirect mechanism “discretionary compensation” is justified because the com-
pensation proposal is left to the discretion of the board and is not contractually contingent on
any realized state. The discretionary payments we model amount to implicit payments for “truth
telling” or equivalently, for taking actions that are against the manager’s self interest.9
8In some cases, boards have many policies that are effectively equivalent. Policies are equivalent if they
produce the same shareholder payoff, the same shareholder suspicion at all shareholder information sets, and the
same manager payoff. For example, for any history in which the manager is conflicted, delegating project selection
to a conflicted manager is equivalent to dictating rejection. We do not distinguish between equivalent polices. So,
for example, when we say the MB ensures project rejection when the manager is conflicted, we are asserting that
either the MB delegates investment policy to the manager (leading to rejection because of the manager’s quiet-life
benefit) or the MB dictates rejection.
9Harford (2003), for example, reports that Bank of America directors received a cash bonus of $300,000 when
Bank of America merged into Nationsbank. The cash bonus was explained as follows: “the purpose also was to
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Finally, we assume that, when the manager is conflicted, offering the discretionary pay
to elicit project information is better for shareholders than accepting or rejecting the project
without offering discretionary pay. Note that, if discretionary pay is used, the shareholders’
payoff is 1−P if the project is accepted and 0 if it is rejected. In the B (resp. M) state, expected
project NPV is negative (zero). Thus, the shareholders’ payoff from dictating investment policy
(rejection in state B and either acceptance or rejection in state M) is zero. For this reason, the
gain from using discretionary pay is (1− θ)(1−P)− 0 in state B and 12(1−P)− 0 in state
M, both of which are positive. In the G state, the project will be accepted in the absence of
discretionary pay, so the gain to shareholders from using discretionary pay is θ(1−P)− (θ −
(1−θ)). Hence, using the discretionary pay mechanism is strictly optimal in all states if and
only if
(1−θ)−θ P > 0. (1)
For the rest of the paper, we assume that condition (1) holds.
2.4 Governance regimes, firm value and welfare
Whether boards are able to offer discretionary compensation depends on the corporate charter.
We consider two regimes: full delegation (FD) and charter restriction (CR). In the FD regime,
the shareholders delegate to the board the task of setting pay and determining investment policy.
Under FD, shareholder intervention is triggered if and only if the board undertakes an egregious
action. We define egregious board actions as those that are never shareholder value- maximizing
in any state of nature.
The FD regime aims to formalize the concept of “director primacy” developed in Bainbridge
(2005). Bainbridge and other legal scholars argue for governance policies in which shareholder
intervention is encouraged only as a last-resort defense against clearly egregious board be-
havior. They also assert that the director primacy perspective informed corporate governance
practice and corporate law in the U.S. before recent legislative interventions. We assume that
the directors are highly averse to intervention and never undertake actions that might provoke
intervention, i.e. boards never undertake clearly egregious actions.
In the CR regime, the shareholders prohibit discretionary compensation payments ex ante
through charter provisions. The CR regime is a stylized version of ex ante constitutional control
of director behavior. While such restrictions might be the result of shareholder activism, they
do involve ex post evaluation of boards by shareholders and thus do not fall within the scope of
thank people who had, after all, voted themselves out of a job by approving the merger.”
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corporate democracy as defined in this paper.
Note that, as shown in Section 2.3, if a shareholder oriented board offers discretionary com-
pensation, it offers discretionary compensation equal to P, and if discretionary compensation
is accepted by the manager, and thus paid, the project is always accepted. As a result, any
compensation policy under which either discretionary compensation not equal to P is paid,
or discretionary compensation is paid and the project is rejected, would identify the board as
manager oriented with certainty. Hence, such compensation would violate the egregious action
constraint. Thus, when the board offers discretionary compensation, it is constrained to offering
the manager a payment of P conditioned on the manager accepting the project.
2.4.1 Board actions when the manager is conflicted
FD regime: We first consider shareholder payoffs when the manager is conflicted. Under the
FD regime, both the SB and the MB offer discretionary compensation. If the manager accepts
it, the project is also accepted. The SB’s policy strictly increases shareholder payoff (relative to
not offering discretionary pay or dictating investment policy), as reflected in condition (1). The
MB’s policy makes the manager as well off as from rejecting the project, and better off than he
would be if the board dictated project acceptance. Under both the SB and MB, the project will
be accepted if and only if it has a positive NPV, in which case, a discretionary payment, P, is
paid to the manager. The shareholder payoffs resulting from the board’s policies are provided
in Table 1.
CR regime: Under the CR regime, the SB cannot extract the manager’s private information
about project NPV using discretionary compensation, so it will strictly prefer to dictate project
acceptance when the state is G and thus the expected NPV is positive. In state B, the project
has negative expected NPV, so the SB is indifferent between dictating rejection and delegating
investment policy (in which case, the manager, to preserve the quiet-life benefit, will reject
the project). In in state M, the project has zero expected NPV, so the SB is indifferent be-
tween dictating acceptance, rejection, or delegation. The MB under the CR regime cannot offer
discretionary compensation. Thus, it can only affect the manager’s welfare through affecting
project selection. Because of the quiet-life benefit to the manager from rejecting the project, the
manager’s welfare is maximized through project rejection. The project will be rejected if either
the board dictates rejection or delegates investment policy to the manager. In either case, the
NPV of the project is lost and shareholders receive a payoff of zero. The shareholder payoffs




Regime State Prob. δ 1−δ
FD
G & P β/4 θ(1−P) θ(1−P)
M & P β/2 12 (1−P) 12 (1−P)
B & P β/4 (1−θ)(1−P) (1−θ)(1−P)
CR
G & P β/4 0 2θ −1
M & P β/2 0 0
B & P β/4 0 0
Table 1: Shareholder payoff when the manager is conflicted for MB and SB Boards, for FD and
CR regimes, in each state of the firm
resulting from the board’s policies described above are provided in Table 1.
2.4.2 Non-conflicted manager
FD regime: Now consider the case of a non-conflicted manager. Under the FD regime, dis-
cretionary pay is not needed to extract information from the manager. Thus, the SB delegates
and the manager accepts the project if and only if it is positive NPV. Because the manager is
not conflicted, discretionary compensation is a windfall for the manager. Thus, the MB will
offer and the manager will accept discretionary compensation regardless of the project’s NPV,
and the project will be accepted. The shareholder payoffs resulting from the board’s policies
are provided in Table 2.
CR regime: Under the CR regime, because the manager is not conflicted and thus is indif-
ferent between project acceptance and rejection, and because discretionary compensation is
blocked, the manager’s payoff is not affected by the board’s policy. Thus, both SB and MB del-
egate investment policy to the manager, and the project is accepted if and only if it is positive
NPV. The shareholder payoffs resulting from the board’s policies are provided in Table 2.
2.4.3 Optimal ex ante policies
Shareholder payoffs for each regime and each board type are determined by multiplying the
entries presented in Tables 1 and 2 with the corresponding probabilities. Using the resulting
shareholder payoffs, the following results are immediate. The proof of this proposition and all
the proofs of all other propositions are provided in the Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Tom




Regime State Prob. δ 1−δ
FD
G & NP (1−β )/4 (2θ −1)−P θ
M & NP (1−β )/2 −P 1/2
B & NP (1−β )/4 −(2θ −1)−P (1−θ)
CR
G & NP (1−β )/4 θ θ
M & NP (1−β )/2 1/2 1/2
B & NP (1−β )/4 (1−θ) (1−θ)
Table 2: Shareholder payoff when the manager is not conflicted for MB and SB Boards, for FD
and CR regimes, in each state of the firm
(a) If the board is shareholder oriented, firm value is lower under a CR regime than under
an FD regime.
(b) If the board is management oriented and β < 12 , firm value is higher under a CR regime
than under an FD regime.
Proposition 1 shows that conditional on the board being an SB, the FD regime creates more
shareholder value than the CR regime. In contrast, for an MB, constitutional restrictions can
be value-increasing if the probability that the manager is conflicted, β , is sufficiently small. It
immediately follows that:
Corollary. Firm value is higher under an FD regime than under a CR regime for β sufficiently
close to 1.
Our analysis produces two main insights. First, allowing the boards to have discretion over
pay can enhance shareholder value relative to banning discretionary pay via the corporate char-
ter. In fact, somewhat counter-intuitively, such discretion is valuable even if the board is likely
to be manager oriented when the likelihood of conflict of interest between the shareholders and
managers is sufficiently high. A manager oriented board diverts resources from shareholders
via “unnecessary” discretionary pay only when the manager is not conflicted. Thus, when the
probability that the manager is conflicted is sufficiently high, it is rational for shareholders to
permit even a board known to be manager oriented to offer discretionary compensation.
Second, the payment of discretionary compensation per se does not indicate board capture.
In recent work, shareholder activism directed at firms with excess pay, and the support for such
activism from shareholders, have been interpreted as evidence of shareholder sophistication and
the efficacy of pay-related activism (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013). However, our analysis indicates
that the use of discretionary pay by boards is not indicative of board disloyalty.
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2.5 Making policy state contingent: the appeal of democracy
Recall that, in our model, outside shareholders observe a noisy, non-verifiable public signal, x,
that is informative about the firm’s investment prospects. In the next section, we examine how,
under shareholder democracy, the outrage constraint can result in restrictions on board behavior
conditioned on this signal. We will show that shareholder democracy can only impose signal
contingency by blocking discretionary compensation after the low signal and permitting it after
the high signal. Moreover, shareholder democracy not only introduces the possibility of sig-
nal contingent restraints on boards, it also changes the optimal behavior of boards through the
introduction of reputational motivations for board actions. Before we examine the combined
effect of democracy on signal-contingency and board behavior in the next section, we would
like to isolate the effect of signal contingency. To isolate this effect, in this section, we tem-
porarily suspend our assumption that the public signal, x, is not verifiable, and determine the
conditions under which signal-contingent charter restrictions, which block discretionary com-
pensation after the low signal x1 but permit it after x2, increase firm value relative to the two ex
ante policies—CR and FD. We term governance under this rather unrealistic charter restriction
the “low-signal contingent block regime.” Clearly, for the low-signal contingent block regime
to be optimal, it must dominate both the CR regime as well as the FD regime. Because the
low-signal contingent block policy coincides with the CR under the low signal, it will dominate
CR if and only if
CR the low-signal contingent block policy produces a higher shareholder payoff than CR
conditioned on the high signal, x2.
Similarly, because the low-signal contingent block policy coincides with FD under the high
signal, it will dominate FD if an only if
FD the low-signal contingent block policy produces a higher shareholder payoff than FD
conditioned on low signal, x1.
For a fixed regime, board type, and state, shareholder payoffs are computed using the payoffs
provided in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 2.4, and averaging across the two states of the manager—
conflicted, which occurs with probability β , and non-conflicted, which occurs with probability
1−β . Next, we compute signal-conditioned state probabilities. Inspecting Figure 1 shows that,
given the low signal, x1, the probabilities of reaching states M and B both equal 1/4, and the
probability of reaching state G equals 0. Thus, Bayes rule implies that the probabilities of M
and B, conditioned on x1, both equal 1/2. Similarly, given high signal, x2, the probabilities of




Regime State x1 x2 δ 1−δ
FD
G 0 1/2 βθ(1−P)+(1−β )((2θ −1)−P) (1−βP)θ
M 1/2 1/2 β 12 (1−P)− (1−β )P (1−βP) 12
B 1/2 0 β (1−θ)(1−P)− (1−β )((2θ −1)+P) (1−θ)(1−βP)
CR
G 0 1/2 (1−β )θ β (2θ −1)+(1−β )θ
M 1/2 1/2 (1−β ) 12 (1−β ) 12
B 1/2 0 (1−β )(1−θ) (1−β )(1−θ)
Table 3: Shareholder payoffs for MB and SB Boards for regimes and states. Shareholder payoffs
for the CR and FD regimes for each state are provided in the table. Shareholder payoffs under
the low-signal contingent block policy are equal to the CR payoffs when the signal is low, x1,
and equal to FD payoffs when the signal is high, x2. The associated state probabilities are given
by the shaded cells in the table.
G and M, conditioned on x2, both equal 1/2. The payoffs and probabilities so computed are
presented in Table 3.
Using the payoffs and probabilities in Table 3, we can compute the expected difference be-
tween shareholder payoffs under the low-signal contingent block policy and CR, conditioned
on signal, x2. In order for condition CR to be satisfied, this difference must be positive. Alge-
braic simplification shows that the following inequality, (2), is necessary and sufficient for the








































In expression (2), the term labeled ∆ represents the gain from the low-signal contingent block
policy relative to policy CR if the signal is uninformative, i.e., θ = 1/2. ICR and IFD account for
the effect of θ , which reflects the information provided by the signal x regarding the NPV of
the project, on the optimality of the low-signal contingent block policy.
Next note that a necessary condition for CCR > 0 and CFD > 0 is that CCR+CFD > 0. Adding
the inequalities in (2) and (3) shows that the condition CCR+CFD > 0 is given by





Thus, the optimality of the low-signal contingent block policy requires that information sig-
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nals are informative. This is an obvious condition for signal contingent contracting to increase
value. More interesting is the requirement that δ −Pβ > 0, which implies that the likelihood
that the board is management oriented, δ , must be large relative to the expected cost of dis-
cretionary compensation under the shareholder optimal policy β P. However, the necessity of
δ −Pβ > 0 for the optimality of the low-signal contingent block policy does not imply that
decreasing β or increasing δ always increases the viability of the low-signal contingent block
policy. Conditions (2) and (3) also require that the absolute value of ∆ not be too large. Note
that, increasing β , the probability that the manager is conflicted, increases the gain from permit-
ting discretionary payments, thereby increasing ∆, the gain from adopting the low-signal block
policy relative to CR. Similarly, increasing δ , the probability that the board is disloyal, reduces
the gain from permitting discretionary compensation, thereby reducing ∆. These assertions are






















Thus, limiting the absolute value of ∆ requires “balancing” β and δ . When β is much larger
than δ , FD dominates the low-signal contingent block policy, and when β is much smaller than
δ , the CR policy dominates the low-signal contingent block policy.
Next note that there exists a generic range of parameter values under which the low-signal
contingent block policy is optimal. The easiest way to see this is to consider parameters in an
open neighborhood of any point where P = 0, β = δ/(1+ δ ), and θ − 1/2 > 0. If P = 0 and
β = δ/(1+δ ), then ∆= 0 and thus conditions (2) and (3) will be satisfied if and only if ICR > 0














The continuity of ICR and IFD in the parameters of the model thus implies that the set of points
in the parameter space that satisfy (2) and (3) contains an open set and is thus generic. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Tom
(i) The low-signal contingent block policy (the state-contingent policy of blocking discre-
tionary compensation only after a low signal realization) produces a higher shareholder
payoff than either the CR or the FD regime if and only if conditions (2) and (3) are simul-
taneously satisfied. There exists a generic subset of parameter values under which these
conditions are satisfied.
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(ii) The following conditions are necessary conditions for conditions (2) and (3) to be satis-
fied, and thus for the optimality of the low-signal contingent block policy:
θ − 12 > 0 and δ −Pβ > 0.
For the low-signal contingent block policy to be optimal, the signal must be informative,
and the probability that the board is disloyal must be fairly high relative to the expected dis-
cretionary payment to the manager made by the SB. In the next section, we develop a model
of shareholder democracy in which state contingency is implemented by shareholder outrage
rather than the commitment to verifiable state-contingent policies. We show that outrage imple-
mentation generates reputational effects which are most costly precisely when board disloyalty
is probable. These reputational distortions drastically shrink the range of parameter values over
which state contingency is valuable.
3 Model of corporate democracy: Democratic equilibria
3.1 Outrage and reputation
We take the perspective that shareholder outrage is triggered by suspicion, that is, the sharehold-
ers’ posterior probability assessment that the board is an MB. Suspicion is rationally generated
through the calculus of probabilities via Bayes Rule. We assume that there is an “outrage
trigger”—a cutoff value, δ¯ , of suspicion, such that suspicion levels in excess of δ¯ generate
outrage. Outrage leads to costly sanctions on the board. We assume that boards are extremely
sanction averse and are thus constrained to outrage feasible actions, that is, actions that do not
generate outrage with positive probability.
3.1.1 Board preferences
If the board is an MB (resp. SB), the board strictly prefers actions which produce a higher
payoff to the manager (shareholders) to all action that produces a lower payoff to the manager
(shareholders). Actions which maximize the payoff to the manager (shareholders) subject to
the outrage feasibility constraint are termed outrage feasible best replies.
When choosing between outrage feasible best replies, the board strictly prefers any action
which produces lower suspicion to any action which produces higher suspicion. An outrage
feasible best reply that minimizes suspicion over the set of all outrage feasible best replies is
termed minimal suspicion outrage feasible best reply. Thus, boards always choose minimal
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suspicion outrage feasible best replies. This assumption can be justified by a model of share-
holder outrage in which the outrage threshold is “nearly” non-stochastic. Informally speaking,
in such an environment, among actions that maximize the board’s objective function and are
outrage feasible, the board will have a slight bias toward those that minimize suspicion because
of a vanishingly slight uncertainty regarding shareholders’ outrage threshold.10 The MB (SB)
board is indifferent over all actions that produce the same payoff to the manager (shareholders)
and the same suspicion.
3.2 Equilibrium
A candidate equilibrium is a three-tuple, with three components, (a) shareholder beliefs: these
are assignments of suspicion levels to each history in the shareholders’ information set. (b)
board strategies: a map from the board’s information sets into board actions and (c) manager
strategies: a map from those managerial information sets at which the manager decides on
investment policy to an accept/reject decision. A shareholder democracy equilibrium is a can-
didate equilibrium which satisfies the conditions for a Perfect Sequential Equilibrium (PSE)
(Grossman and Perry, 1986).
In some cases, multiple equilibria exist which produce different payoffs for shareholders. In
these cases we focus on the equilibria that produce the highest shareholder payoffs. This moti-
vates the following definition—A shareholder democracy equilibrium is a shareholder optimal
democratic equilibrium if there does not exist another shareholder democracy equilibrium that
produces a strictly higher ex ante payoff for shareholders.11
The PSE concept requires that, at all off-equilibrium histories of the game, uninformed
agents’ beliefs must be consistent, if consistent beliefs for that history exist. A belief is a
probability distribution over the types of the informed agent. A belief is consistent if, given the
probability distribution, there exists a weak best response for the uninformed party such that,
for that response, the support of the probability distribution contains only those types which
would weakly gain from deviating from the equilibrium.
In essence, consistent beliefs are self-fulfilling beliefs. If the uninformed party believes that
a set of types is weakly willing to deviate from the equilibrium to the off-equilibrium history and
acts accordingly, that set of types (and only that set of types) will be weakly willing to deviate.
10See Online Supplement A for further discussion.
11When equilibrium is qualified by a restriction, shareholder optimality requires that the equilibrium is optimal
over the restricted set. e.g, if the restriction is “compensation is blocked” then a shareholder optimal equilibrium is
an equilibrium with the property that no equilibrium in which compensation is blocked produces a higher payoff.
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If no consistent beliefs exist, which will be the case, for example, if the payoff from deviation
is strongly dominated, then PSE places no restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs. If multiple
consistent beliefs exist, then any one of the consistent beliefs can be held by the uninformed
agent. For the rationale for this equilibrium concept and more technical details, see Grossman
and Perry (1986).
3.3 Shareholder information sets
The basic information structure for the model is detailed in Section 2 and Figure 1. At this
point, we need to work out the implications of this structure for the ex post information that is
available to shareholders when assessing the board. From our earlier analysis, we see that if
positive discretionary compensation is offered, the level of compensation must be set at Dc = P.
Any other discretionary payment would reveal that the board is not shareholder-oriented and
thus violate the outrage feasibility constraint.12 Thus, the board will either offer discretionary
compensation equal to P or not offer discretionary compensation at all. This greatly restricts
the possible shareholder information sets. The number of information sets is also restricted
because shareholders cannot distinguish between (a) no discretionary pay being offered and
the project being rejected by the manager, and (b) discretionary pay being offered and the
project being rejected by the manager, and (c) the project being rejected by the board. Thus,
the information available to shareholders at the time they evaluate the loyalty of the board
will consist of a public signal and their observation of compensation/investment policy. The
shareholder observed compensation/investment policy will be one of the following:
(a) project rejection: the project is rejected in which case discretionary compensation is never
paid,
(b) project acceptance with discretionary compensation: the project is accepted and the man-
ager receives a discretionary compensation payment of P,
(c) project acceptance without discretionary compensation: the project is accepted and the
manager does not receive a discretionary compensation payment.
In the sequel, we will refer to shareholder information sets and shareholder observed com-
pensation policies simply as “histories.” Through the outrage constraint, shareholder beliefs
12Offering discretionary compensation Dc 6= P produces strictly lower shareholder welfare than both not of-
fering discretionary compensation at all or offering discretionary compensation Dc = P. Thus, if we extended
the action space to include, Dc 6= P, it would be easy to show that no equilibria exist in which offering discre-
tionary compensation unequal to P occurs in equilibrium with positive probability. Thus, including all possible
levels of discretionary compensation in the action space would make the action space for the board infinite, require
additional notation, and in the end, have no effect on our conclusions.
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associated with a given history can block board actions that lead with positive probability to
that history.
3.4 Parameter restrictions
Finally, we impose some additional restrictions on the parameter space of the game: (a) δ <
δ¯ < 1, (b) β < β¯ = 13 .
Assumption (a) implies that there is scope for differences in the shareholder information sets
produced by MB and SB, yet reputation matters to the board. If δ¯ < δ , since the expectation of
a posterior probability (i.e., suspicion) always equals the prior probability, it would have to be
the case that at some history reached with positive probability, shareholder suspicion exceeded
the outrage threshold. Thus, no board strategy would satisfy outrage feasibility. If δ¯ = δ ,
then for the same reason as stated above, suspicion would have to be the same at every history
reached with positive probability. In either case, the model would not be very interesting.
Assumption (b) ensures that the likelihood of the manager being conflicted is not too high.
This is the interesting case because, the higher the likelihood that the manager is conflicted, the
less likely it is that grants of discretionary compensation are inappropriate. In fact if β = 1,
the problem we model vanishes. In this case, it is common knowledge that paying discre-
tionary compensation increases firm value and the terms of shareholder-value-maximizing dis-
cretionary compensation are also common knowledge. Thus, the MB and the SB would follow
the same policy: using efficient discretionary compensation to induce the manager to reveal
project information.
When β is high but less than 1, the probability that the manager is conflicted is large. Thus,
shareholders are not “surprised” by discretionary compensation grants even following adverse
signals relating to firm performance. If the MB also pays discretionary compensation to the
manager in the (unlikely) event that the manager is not conflicted, the likelihood that the MB
pays discretionary compensation will not be much higher than the likelihood that the SB pays
discretionary compensation. Thus, paying discretionary compensation will not significantly in-
crease shareholder suspicion. However, if the MB always rejects the project when the manager
is conflicted, because being conflicted is very probable, the MB’s likelihood of rejection will be
much higher than the SB’s. In this case, shareholder outrage would be most pronounced when
the project is rejected rather than when discretionary compensation is paid. Since our interest
in this paper is to analyze the consequences of outrage triggered by compensation policy rather
than project accept/reject decisions, high β parameterizations do not capture the situation we
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aim to model.13
It is interesting to consider the β < 1/3 restriction in light of Proposition 1. The continu-
ity of shareholder payoffs in the probability that the board is disloyal, δ , and Proposition 1.a
imply that FD always dominates CR when δ is sufficiently close to 0. Continuity, the param-
eter restriction, β < 1/3, and Proposition 1.b imply that CR always dominates FD when δ is
sufficiently close to 1. In the subsequent analysis, we aim to compare the best of these two poli-
cies, FD and CR, from a shareholder perspective, with the outcome of a shareholder democracy
where shareholders’ ex post evaluations of board loyalty constrains discretionary compensation
policy.
4 Democratic equilibria
4.1 Effect of outrage on board behavior
We initiate our analysis by deriving an “obvious result,” but one which will permit us to reduce
the number of equilibrium configurations we need to consider.
Lemma 1. In any shareholder democracy equilibrium, accepting the project and not paying
discretionary compensation is outrage feasible whenever both rejecting the project, and ac-
cepting the project while paying discretionary compensation, are outrage feasible.
The logic behind the Lemma is straightforward. Outrage feasibility implies that board ac-
tions that lead to histories that violate the outrage constraint are off the equilibrium path. In
order for accepting the project without discretionary compensation to be infeasible under the
outrage constraint, shareholders’ beliefs conditioned on observing project acceptance without
discretionary compensation must assign a high probability to board disloyalty. However, ac-
cepting the project without offering discretionary compensation is sometimes the unique op-
timal action for the SB and is never the unique optimal action for the MB. For this reason,
the consistency conditions on off-equilibrium beliefs imposed by PSE cannot rationalize share-
holder beliefs that associate accepting the project without paying discretionary compensation
with disloyalty.
The discussion in Section 3.3 showed that there are only three shareholder observable com-
pensation/investment policies. This implies, given the restrictions on the patterns of outrage
13The restriction of β < 1/3 imposed in this manuscript is somewhat stronger than required to keep the focus
of shareholder suspicion on discretionary compensation payments. The stronger restriction greatly simplifies
the analysis by ensuring pure-strategy solutions when discretionary compensation is not blocked by shareholder
outrage. For a slightly more general specification, see the working paper version of this paper.
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feasibility imposed by Lemma 1, that for each public signal, x, there are only four possible
types of equilibrium configurations: outrage does not block any compensation/investment pol-
icy; outrage blocks project acceptance with discretionary compensation; outrage blocks project
acceptance completely because acceptance with or without discretionary compensation pay-
ments is not outrage feasible; or outrage blocks project rejection completely because project
rejection is not outrage feasible. In the later two configurations, shareholder outrage forces
project choice rather than restricts compensation policy. Because this paper is concerned the
effect of shareholder democracy on compensation rather than project selection, we will concen-
trate on the first two equilibrium configurations. Thus, we consider, for each public signal, two
types of equilibria: equilibria in which discretionary compensation is not blocked by the outrage
constraint and equilibria in which the outrage constraint blocks discretionary compensation.
4.2 Equilibrium configurations
4.2.1 Democratic equilibria in which discretionary compensation is not blocked by outrage
We first characterize equilibria in which outrage does not block discretionary compensation. In
these equilibria, SB are not blocked from employing discretionary compensation and will use
discretionary compensation when it increases firm value. Thus, deviations from shareholder
optimum policies will only occur when the board is management oriented. As pointed out in
the discussion of full delegation in Section 2.4, even in the absence of any reputational concerns
generated by shareholder outrage, an MB has an incentive to abuse discretionary compensation
by offering it when it is not necessary, i.e. when the manager is not conflicted. In this section,
we show that democracy exacerbates this misalignment—under democracy the MB not only
has an incentive to pay discretionary compensation when such compensation does not increase
firm value, but also to withhold discretionary compensation when it does increase firm value.
Proposition 3. In any shareholder democracy equilibrium in which discretionary pay is offered
after either public signal,
a. an MB offers and pays discretionary compensation, leading to acceptance of the project
regardless of its NPV, whenever the manager is not conflicted, and ensures that the project
is rejected when the manager is conflicted.
b. an SB offers discretionary compensation if and only if the manager is conflicted, leading to
project acceptance if and only if the project has positive NPV.
c. shareholder payoffs are strictly lower under democracy than under a full delegation regime.
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The intuition for Proposition 3 is that under democracy, board reputation with shareholders
is important. Paying discretionary compensation is a more suspicious action than rejecting the
project. Thus, withholding discretionary compensation and rejecting the project when the man-
ager is conflicted, while paying discretionary compensation when the manager is not conflicted,
permits the manager oriented board to both limit the overall use of discretionary compensation
and, at the same time, maximize the manager’s payoff. Since paying discretionary compen-
sation to conflicted managers and extracting their private information about project NPV has
significant benefits to shareholders, this withholding of compensation from conflicted managers
lowers shareholder welfare relative to that under full delegation.
4.2.2 When outrage blocks discretionary pay
When shareholders’ posterior assessment associated with paying discretionary compensation
crosses the outrage constraint, neither the MB nor the SB will pay discretionary compensa-
tion. Thus, the policies of both the MB and the SB deviate from the shareholder optimum
policy. While the CR regime, which disallows discretionary compensation, also deviates from
the shareholder optimal policy by banning discretionary compensation, the following proposi-
tion shows that the reputational concerns induced by shareholder democracy leads to additional
distortions when the public signal is high, that is, x = x2.
Proposition 4. Shareholder optimal democratic equilibria in which the outrage constraint
blocks discretionary pay have the following properties:
• After the high public signal, x = x2:
(a) The MB always rejects the project when the manager is conflicted. When the man-
ager is not conflicted, the MB randomizes, delegating investment policy to the man-
ager with probability α and forcing project acceptance regardless of NPV with prob-
ability 1−α , where
α = 1− β
1−β
1
1− (θ − 1/2) .
(b) When the manager is not conflicted, the SB delegates investment policy to the man-
ager. When the manager is conflicted, the SB accepts the project when the board’s
private signal equals G and rejects the project when the private signal is M.
(c) In equilibrium, the choice between acceptance and rejection of the investment is not
informative about board loyalty.
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(d) Shareholder payoffs are lower under democracy than they would have been under
the charter restriction policy.
• After the low public signal, x = x1:
(a) Both the MB and SB follow the shareholder optimal outrage feasible policy of del-
egating investment policy to the manager when the manager is not conflicted and,
when the manager is conflicted, rejecting the project. In equilibrium, the choice
between acceptance and rejection is not informative about board loyalty.
(b) Shareholder payoffs under democracy equal shareholder payoffs under charter re-
strictions.
The basic tension that drives Proposition 4 is the MB’s preference for project rejection when
the manager is conflicted, and how this preference aligns with SB preferences. When the man-
ager is not conflicted, the board’s project acceptance is effectively conditional on the project’s
NPV being positive. However, when the manager is conflicted, the outrage block on discre-
tionary compensation makes it impossible to incorporate the manager’s private information into
the accept/reject decision. So an SB will base its accept/ reject decision on its imperfect signal
about project NPV. Because the manager is conflicted due to his “quiet life” preferences, the
MB will reject the project. When the public signal is low, x = x1, project NPV is ex ante non-
positive under both possible board signals M and B. Thus when the manager is conflicted, SB
and MB preferences align and favor rejection. This alignment supports a shareholder optimal
outcome (subject to the constraint on discretionary compensation being blocked) in which the
MB and SB follow the same policy. In contrast, under the high public signal, one of the possible
board signals, G, corresponds to the expected NPV of the project being positive. Thus, when the
manager is conflicted, the SB will sometimes force project acceptance. Hence, if the MB rejects
the project whenever the manager is conflicted but follows the shareholder optimal delegation
policy when the manger is not conflicted, the MB would be more likely to reject the project than
an SB, and project rejection would increase suspicion. To counter this increase in suspicion, the
MB lowers its probability of rejection by sometimes accepting negative NPV projects when the
manager is not conflicted. Such acceptances lower shareholder welfare relative to that under
charter restriction. The equilibrium probability of accepting negative NPV projects when the
manager is non-conflicted is set so that the MB and SB have the same probability, conditioned
on x2, of rejection, and thus, again rejection is not informative.
An important implication of Propositions 3 and 4 is that, conditional on discretionary pay
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being either outrage feasible under both public signals or being blocked under both, democracy
is dominated from the perspective of shareholder welfare. Thus, for democracy to increase
shareholder value, it must impose “signal-contingent” restrictions on discretionary compensa-
tion policy, restricting discretionary compensation after some public signals and permitting it
after others. Therefore, outrage must block discretionary compensation under one of the public
signals and permit it under the other. What sort of signal-contingent restrictions will democ-
racy impose? Since outrage is triggered by suspicion, this reduces to the question: under which
signal will discretionary compensation trigger a higher level of suspicion? The answer to this
question is not surprising: paying discretionary compensation is more suspicious after the low
signal, x1.
Proposition 5. In any shareholder optimal democratic equilibrium in which discretionary com-
pensation is paid after both signals x1 and x2, paying it after the receipt of a low signal is the
most suspicious action the board undertakes.
The logic behind this proposition is straightforward: Compared with an MB, the SB pays
discretionary compensation with a higher probability when the signal is high, x2, than when it
is low, x1. Thus, paying discretionary compensation generates more suspicion when it is paid
after the low signal than when it is paid after the high signal.
An important empirical implication follows from the same logic that is behind Proposition 5.
The proposition follows from the fact that discretionary compensation is more likely to be paid
after firms receive good news about future prospects. Note that this prediction crucially de-
pends on the “quiet life” assumption regarding managerial preferences. Under this assumption,
discretionary compensation is paid to induce the manager to undertake positive NPV projects,
and shareholders are least suspicious of such compensation under the high signal, when their
assessment of the probability that the project is positive NPV is high. Under the contrasting
“empire building” assumption, discretionary compensation is paid to induce the manager to re-
ject negative NPV projects. Thus, under this assumption, shareholders would be less suspicious
of discretionary compensation after a low signal, because such a signal indicates that project
NPV is likely to be negative. Hence, an empire-building version of this model predicts that
discretionary compensation is more likely to be paid after firms receive bad news about future
prospects. This implies that empirically testing the relationship between firm performance and
the payment of discretionary compensation can provide evidence on the relative prevalence of
quiet life versus empire building managerial preferences.
A straightforward consequence of Proposition 5 and the belief consistency condition im-
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posed by the definition of a Perfect Sequential Equilibrium is that, if a shareholder democracy
equilibrium blocks discretionary compensation conditioned on the high signal x2 (under which
making discretionary payments to the manager is less suspicious), the equilibrium must also
block discretionary payments conditioned on the low signal, x1 (under which discretionary
compensation is more suspicious).
Lemma 2. No shareholder democracy equilibrium exists in which discretionary compensation
is blocked after signal x2 but not blocked after signal x1.
5 A role for democracy?
Our results have shown that, for any given signal, ex ante commitment regimes always dominate
democracy. However, ex ante restrictions are not signal-contingent. Democratic equilibria, in
contrast, can impose signal-dependent constraints on board behavior. As shown in Section 2.5,
if we ignore the distortion costs of democracy, signal-conditioned restrictions can, in some
cases, increase firm value. Thus, the natural question to ask is whether the signal contingency
produced by democracy is ever worth the attendant distortion costs. In this section, we answer
this question in the affirmative but show that the conditions required to make democracy optimal
are quite stringent.
To investigate whether democracy is sometimes better than commitment we define “better”
in a way that is most generous towards democratic governance.
Definition. Shareholder democracy is the optimal governance regime if there exists any outrage
threshold under which there is a shareholder democracy equilibrium which produces higher
firm value than both charter restrictions and full delegation.
Note that the standard we are imposing for democratic governance to create value is “lib-
eral” in that we tune the outrage threshold to a value that maximizes shareholder value, and
restrict attention to the democracy equilibrium that produces the highest ex ante payoff to share-
holders.
We have determined the shareholder optimal equilibria for each signal in Propositions 3
and 4. These propositions show that when outrage either allows discretionary compensation,
or blocks it, after both signals, shareholder democracy is inferior from the perspective of share-
holder welfare to one of the two ex ante regimes, FD and CR. Hence shareholder democracy
can dominate both of these regimes only when it generates a signal-contingent block on discre-
tionary compensation. Lemma 2 shows that such a state contingent block must take the form of
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blocking discretionary compensation after the low signal x1 but not blocking discretionary com-
pensation after high signal x2. Next note that there always exists an outrage threshold between
the suspicion levels generated by discretionary compensation under the high and low signals.
It is only possible for shareholder democracy to improve shareholder welfare when the outrage
threshold lies between these two suspicion levels and discretionary compensation is blocked by
the outrage constraint after signal x2 and not blocked by the outrage constraint after signal x2.
Therefore, to identify the conditions under which shareholder democracy is optimal, we
need only compare shareholder welfare under the two ex ante regimes, FD and CR, with that in
the shareholder optimal democratic equilibria in which outrage blocks discretionary compensa-
tion after the low public signal, x1 and permits discretionary compensation after the high public
signal, x2. Using the characterizations of board behavior developed in Propositions 3 and 4,
we first compute the shareholder payoffs conditioned on the public and board signals. These
payoffs are presented in Table 4.
Board Orientation
Disc. Comp. Event Prob. MB SB
permitted G&x2
1/4 (1−β )((2θ −1)−P) β (θ (1−P))+(1−β )θ
M &x2 1/4 −(1−β )P β ( 12 (1−P))+(1−β ) 12
blocked M &x1
1/4 (1−β ) 12 (1−β ) 12
B&x1 1/4 (1−β )(1−θ) (1−β )(1−θ)
Table 4: Shareholder signal-contingent payoffs under democracy.
Next, we take expectations over the signal contingent payoffs to determine ex ante share-
holder payoff under the shareholder democracy regime, and compare this payoff with share-
holder payoffs under the two ex ante regimes, CR and FD. The question we ask is: when does
shareholder democracy produce higher shareholder payoffs than in the two ex ante regimes.
The following proposition provides some insight into this question.
Proposition 6. Shareholder democracy is not optimal if either (a) δ < Pβ , or (b) δ > β , or
(c) θ − 12 < β1−β .
These conditions illustrate the limitations of shareholder democracy as an efficient check on
board opportunism. Condition (a) simply follows from noting that the shareholder payoff from
democracy is always strictly smaller than the shareholder payoff under low-signal contingent
block regime, and applying the necessary condition for the optimality of the low-signal con-
tingent regime provided in Proposition 2.ii. This shows that democracy can never be optimal
if the probability of board disloyalty is sufficiently small in relation to P and β . Condition (b)
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shows that δ also cannot be very high in relation to β . Together, these two conditions confirm
the intuition from equations (2) and (3) in Section 2.5 that δ cannot be far away from β for
state contingent policies to dominate commitment policies. Condition (b), in particular, high-
lights the fact that the arguments for shareholder democracy based on pervasive board capture
and grants are not confirmed by our analysis. In fact, because of the distortionary effect of
democracy on the behavior of disloyal boards, the higher the probability that the board is dis-
loyal, the larger the losses from policy distortion associated with MB boards that are induced by
democratic governance. At the same time, the expected benefit of democracy relative to charter
restrictions is small if the probability that offering discretionary compensation is shareholder
optimal, i.e., β is small.
Finally, Condition (c) shows that democracy is also never optimal when signal informa-
tiveness is low relative to the probability that the manager is conflicted. The benefit of an
outrage constraint on compensation depends on how effectively the shareholders’ signal—the
trigger for outrage—identifies the conditions of the firm under which discretionary compensa-
tion is particularly unlikely to be optimal for the shareholders. This effectiveness is measured
by θ − 1/2. One cost of democracy is that outrage may block the efficient use of discretionary
compensation to induce information revelation by conflicted managers. Since the probability
that the manager is conflicted is given by β , this implies that the effectiveness of the shareholder
signal must be large relative to the odds that the manager is conflicted, β/(1−β ).14
The existence of a range of parameter values for which none of the conditions in Proposi-
tion 6 holds is necessary for the existence of a shareholder democracy equilibrium that produces
higher shareholder welfare than both CR and FD, but is hardly sufficient. Imposing all of the in-
centive constraints required to support a shareholder welfare improving democratic equilibrium
in fact requires a very careful choice of parameters for the model. This supports our intuition
that shareholder democracy might be optimal for some firms but that, once the costs of demo-
cratic distortion are considered, democracy is not likely to be the sort of globally and robustly
optimal governance mechanism that should be legislated.15
14Note that this condition alone implies that democracy can never be optimal if β = 13 .
15For a more detailed discussion of the parameter space supporting shareholder democracy as an optimal gov-
ernance mechanism, see the working paper version of this paper.
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6 Conclusion
Shareholder democracy constrains board discretionary compensation policy based on ex post
evaluations by relatively uninformed shareholders. It is apparent that, if boards are loyal to
shareholders and thus pursue shareholder value maximization, shareholder democracy cannot
improve shareholder welfare as it substitutes the judgments of uninformed agents for the judg-
ments of better informed agents with the same objectives. Our contribution is to show that when
boards are disloyal, shareholder democracy also imposes significant costs: the reputational in-
centives engendered by democracy lead management-captured boards to take actions even more
detrimental to shareholder welfare than they would have in a full-delegation “director primacy”
regime. Thus, legally mandating increased shareholder influence over compensation policy is
problematic.
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A Appendix: Proofs of results
Preliminaries
In order to track the histories of the game at which shareholders form beliefs, we require some
notation. As discussed in Section 3.3, for each fixed public signal, there are three possible
shareholder-observed compensation/investment policies: project rejection, project acceptance
with discretionary compensation, and project acceptance without discretionary compensation.
We represent project rejection by R, project acceptance with discretionary compensation by
A+, and project acceptance without discretionary compensation by A−. Given that there are two
possible public signals, x1 and x2, there are six information sets at which shareholders form pos-
terior beliefs concerning board loyalty: (x1,R),(x1,A+),(x1,A−),(x2,R),(x2,A+),(x2,A−).
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider part (a). Note first from Table 2 that when the manager is
not conflicted, shareholder payoff is the same in every state of the firm for FD and CR regimes
under an SB. Thus, we need only to calculate the expected payoffs under the two regimes when
the manager is conflicted. From the expected payoff to shareholders using the state-by-state
payoffs in Table 1, it can be shown that the condition required for shareholder value to be
























It is easy to check that the condition holds given (1).
Now consider part (b). Computing the expected payoff to shareholders under FD and MB,
FD
Sh:MB, using the state-by-state payoffs in Table 1 and Table 2 yields





















Similarly, using Table 1 and Table 2, we obtain the payoffs under MB and CR, uCRSh:MB:
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Hence, the results easily follow.
Proof of Lemma 1. For a given signal, x, consider a candidate equilibrium in which accepting
the project without paying discretionary compensation is not outrage feasible, the candidate
equilibrium has assigned suspicion to (x,A−) of δˆ ∗(x,A−) which satisfies, δˆ ∗(x,A−) > δ¯ .
Because (x,A−) is blocked by the outrage constraint, this history is off the equilibrium path.
This belief is not consistent in the sense of Grossman and Perry (1986): Given this belief and
the outrage constraint, the set of types that would weakly gain from defecting to an action which
would lead to (x,A−) is empty. Thus, this belief, δˆ ∗(x,A−), will satisfy the PSE conditions if
and only if no consistent belief can be assigned to A−.
Consider the candidate consistent belief assignment δˆ o(x,A−) = 0. This candidate consis-
tent belief is clearly less than the outrage threshold. Thus, under the candidate consistent belief,
reaching (x,A−) is outrage feasible. By hypothesis, outrage does not block reaching (x,A+) or
(x,R). Thus, in the candidate equilibrium, when the manager is not conflicted, the manager’s
payoff is maximized over outrage feasible policies by offering discretionary compensation.
When the manager is conflicted, the manager’s payoff is maximized by either rejecting the
project or offering discretionary compensation. In either case, the manager’s payoff is strictly
higher than it would be if history (x,A−) were reached.
Thus, under the candidate consistent belief, the MB will not defect from the equilibrium to
any action that leads to (x,A−) with positive probability. Under the candidate consistent belief,
the SB’s optimal action is to not offer discretionary compensation if and only if the manager
is not conflicted. This strategy will lead to (x,A−) with positive probability. Thus, given the
candidate consistent belief, the only type defecting from the candidate equilibrium will be the
SB when the manager is not conflicted.
Conditioned on the set of defecting types under the candidate consistent belief, Bayes rule
will assign zero probability to the board being disloyal when (x,A−) is reached. Thus, the
candidate consistent belief, δˆ o(x,A−) equals the belief produced by Bayes rule conditioned on
the set of defecting types generated by the candidate consistent belief. Thus, δˆ o(x,A−) is a
consistent belief assignment. Hence, the candidate equilibrium fails to satisfy the conditions
for a PSE.
Proof of Proposition 3. We need to compute the odds ratios associated with the three possible
compensation/investment histories that shareholders can observe, conditioned on the two public
signals, x1 and x2.We start by considering signal x2 and explain in detail the odds ratio associ-
ated with rejecting the project after public signal x2, o(x2,R). Since the explanation is the same
for all of the remaining odds ratio calculations, we will simply present these without detailed
derivations.
The odds ratio for (x2,R) is the ratio between the posterior probability that the board is MB
conditioned on (x2,R), and the posterior probability that the board is SB conditioned on (x2,R).
By Bayes rule, this ratio is equal to the ratio of the joint probabilities. Thus, the odds ratio is









(1−δ )P[(x2,R)|SB] . (A-3)
Under the conjectured equilibrium strategy, the MB rejects the project when the manager is
conflicted and never rejects the project when the manager is not conflicted. Thus, equation (A-3)
and the state probabilities provided by Figure 1 show that




The SB, without offering discretionary compensation when the manager is not conflicted,
and offering discretionary compensation when the manager is conflicted, will assure that the
project is rejected if and only if it has a negative NPV. Thus, equation (A-3) and the state
probabilities provided by Figure 1 show that














(1−δ ) (18 + 14 (1−θ)) = δ1−δ 4β3−2θ . (A-6)
Applying the same logic we can compute the likelihood ratios for the other histories reached at












































i.e., o(x2,A+)> o(x2,R). Thus, the most suspicious action that the board can take after x2 is to
pay discretionary compensation, A+. By the hypothesis of the proposition, this action is outrage
feasible. Thus, by Lemma 1, A− and R are also outrage feasible. In the conjectured equilib-
rium the SB is implementing the shareholder optimal policy. So, clearly the SB is playing a
best response. The conjectured equilibrium calls for the MB to pay discretionary compensation
when the manager is not conflicted. Because paying discretionary compensation is outrage fea-
sible and maximizes the non-conflicted manager’s payoff, the candidate equilibrium strategy
is a best reply when the manager is not conflicted. Now consider the MB’s strategy when the
manager is conflicted. The candidate equilibrium calls for the project to be rejected in this case.
Because the manager is conflicted, the manager is indifferent between receiving discretionary
compensation and rejecting the project. Equation (A-9) shows that paying discretionary com-
pensation is more suspicious than rejecting the project. Given the manager’s indifference when
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not conflicted, minimum suspicion requires that the MB reject the project. Thus, the MB is
playing a best reply when the manager is conflicted and the equilibrium is verified.
Now consider alternative equilibria under the hypothesis that discretionary compensation is
outrage feasible. By Lemma 1, this implies that all three policies are outrage feasible. Thus, the
SB must follow the shareholder value maximizing policy, the same policy that the SB follows
in the verified equilibrium. The MB must pay discretionary compensation to non-conflicted
managers for the reasons outlined above. The only scope for an alternative equilibria is for the
MB, when the manager is conflicted, to offer discretionary compensation. However, an increase
in the probability that the MB offers discretionary compensation when the manager is conflicted
would increase the ratio o(x2,A+)/o(x2,R), i.e., make paying discretionary compensation even
more suspicious. Since o(x2,A+)/o(x2,R) > 1 even in the verified equilibrium, in which the
probability that the MB offers discretionary compensation to the conflicted manager is zero, in
a candidate equilibrium in which the MB offered discretionary compensation to the manager
with positive probability, it would also have to be the case that o(x2,A+) > o(x2,R). For
the same reason, in any equilibrium (that featured a positive probability that the MB offers
discretionary compensation to the conflicted manager) in which discretionary compensation is
outrage feasible, it would be the case that o(x2,A+)> o(x2,R). However, under the hypothesis
that discretionary compensation is outrage feasible, the other two histories, R and A− would
also be outrage feasible. If the MB ensures rejection, the history R is always reached and this
history would thus generate less suspicion while providing the manager with the same payoff.
Hence, offering discretionary compensation to the conflicted manager would violate minimum
suspicion. Thus, a candidate equilibrium in which the MB pays discretionary compensation
when the manager is conflicted cannot exists. Hence, the verified equilibrium is unique.
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−) = 0. (A-10)









Thus, discretionary compensation is the most suspicious history which the board can reach.
An identical argument to the x = x2 case then verifies the equilibrium and shows that it is
unique.
Proof of Proposition 4. First consider public signal x = x2. The odds ratio associated with




















where we have used the fact that the SB will force acceptance in state G. Substituting the
definition of α from the proposition into the right-hand side of expression (A-11) shows that
o(x2,R) = δ/(1− δ ), the prior odds ratio. Because only two histories, R and A− can be
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reached under the assumption that outrage blocks paying discretionary compensation, and, at
one history, the odds ratio equals the prior odds ratio, the odds ratio at the other history must
also equal the prior odds ratio, i.e., o(x2,A−) = δ/(1−δ ). Thus, the candidate equilibrium is
a signal jamming equilibrium.
Next note that, under the candidate equilibrium strategy, the SB is following a shareholder
efficient policy conditioned on discretionary compensation not being outrage feasible. When
the manager is non-conflicted, the SB delegates investment policy to the manager, ensuring that
the project is undertaken if and only if it is positive NPV. When the manager is conflicted, dis-
cretionary compensation cannot be used to extract information from the manager. Under board
signal G, the project is expected to have positive NPV and the candidate strategy calls for the
board to accept the project. Under signal M, the project is expected to have zero NPV and the
candidate strategy calls for the project to be rejected. The MB always rejects the project when
the manager is conflicted, thus maximizing the welfare of the conflicted manager, and ran-
domizes between delegation and ensuring acceptance when the manager is not conflicted, and
thus is indifferent to investment policy. Both acceptance and rejection produce the same level
of suspicion, and thus these strategies by the SB and MB also satisfy the minimum suspicion
criterion. Thus the equilibrium is verified.
Now consider alternative equilibria. We argue that there is no alternative equilibrium that
produces a higher ex ante payoff to the shareholder. First, consider mixed-strategy equilibria.
The SB will never randomize when either the manager is not conflicted, or the manager is con-
flicted and the board signal is G or B. In these cases, there is a unique shareholder welfare
maximizing policy – the same policy as specified in the verified equilibrium. Next note that
the MB will never randomize when the manager is conflicted because in this case, under the
assumption of the proposition that discretionary compensation is blocked, rejection is the only
outcome that maximizes the manager’s payoff. Finally note that any such alternative equilibria
would also have to be signal jamming. This follows because suspicion across the two alter-
natives would have to be equated at the two histories and, because there are only two feasible
histories, equating suspicion can only occur if the suspicion associated with both equals prior
suspicion.
Conditional on the SB rejecting the project under signal M, α is the unique randomiza-
tion probability that equates prior and posterior odds. Thus, the alternative outrage feasible
shareholder efficient equilibria would involve randomization by the SB when the manager is
conflicted and the board signal is M and thus the expected NPV equals 0. Let γ represent the
probability that the SB accepts the project in this case. Note that in the verified equilibrium
γ = 0. Increasing γ would reduce the probability that the SB rejects the project. In order
to maintain signal jamming, the probability that the MB rejects would also have to be lower.
Thus, the MB would have to ensure acceptance with a higher probability. Since ensuring accep-
tance when the manager is not conflicted lowers shareholder welfare, the resulting equilibrium
would not be shareholder efficient.
Now consider pure strategy equilibria. Note that a pure strategy equilibrium, in which the
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MB always delegates project selection when the manager is not conflicted, does not exist. If the
MB always delegated to the non-conflicted manager, because the MB always rejects when the
manager is conflicted, the MB would be rejecting the project with a higher probability than the
SB, and rejection would thus be more suspicious than acceptance. Because the non-conflicted
manager is indifferent, and since rejection is more suspicious, permitting the manager to reject
the project would violate the minimum suspicion condition. The other candidate pure strategy
equilibrium, where the MB always forces acceptance when the manager is not-conflicted, is
clearly less shareholder efficient as it involves a smaller probability of choosing the shareholder
optimal action of delegation when the manager is non conflicted, and thus also cannot be a
shareholder efficient democratic equilibria.
Now consider the case where the signal x = x1. In this case, the ex ante NPV of the project
is non-positive. Information about the project’s NPV cannot be extracted from the manager
after signal x1 because of the shareholder outrage constraint. Thus, an optimal policy for both
the SB and the MB is to reject the project when the manager is conflicted and delegate when the
manager is not conflicted. If this policy is followed by both the MB and the SB, board policy
will not be informative about board loyalty and thus shareholder suspicion will equal δ at both
shareholder information sets, A− and R. Thus, for both the MB and SB, the policy of rejecting
the project when the manager is conflicted, and delegating when the manager is not conflicted,
is an outrage feasible minimum suspicion best reply given the shareholders’ conjecture that
both board types will follow this policy. Thus, these policies are equilibrium policies when out-
rage blocks discretionary compensation. Clearly, because these polices maximize shareholder
payoffs subject to the outrage constraint blocking discretionary compensation, the equilibrium
is a shareholder-optimal equilibrium. Since any other policy would lower shareholder payoffs,
it is the unique shareholder optimal equilibrium policy.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is a straightforward calculation. From the proofs of Proposi-
tion 3 we know that the suspicion associated with paying discretionary compensation for a given
public signal x is always higher than the suspicion associated with any other history. Thus, we
need only show that the suspicion associated with paying discretionary compensation is higher
under x1 than under x2. Using expressions (A-7) and (A-10) we see that the ratio between these














−1 = 1. (A-12)
Proof of Lemma 2. In order to prove Lemma 2, we require the following technical lemma,
which bounds the set of parameters that, for a given outrage constraint, can rule out discre-
tionary compensation being blocked conditioned on the high signal, x2.








then no equilibrium exists in which discretionary compensation is blocked by the outrage con-
straint conditioned on the signal being x2.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is tedious, but quite routine. A candidate belief is a consistent
belief (Grossman and Perry (1986)) if it can constructed using Bayes rule under the assumption
that probability of defection from the equilibrium for each type (i.e, state of the board, state of
the firm, and state of the manager) is an outrage-feasible best reply to the candidate consistent
belief. Because Bayes rule only determines conditional probabilities for events with positive
probability, under a consistent belief, defection must at least be a weak best reply for one type.
A PSE requires that the belief assigned to an off-equilibrium history must be consistent, as
long as a consistent belief for that history can be shown to exist.
We first show that equilibrium beliefs about the disloyalty of the board (suspicion) that
exceed the outrage threshold are never consistent beliefs. Thus, for such beliefs to satisfy the
conditions for a PSE, it must be the case that no consistent beliefs can be constructed for the off-
equilibrium history. We then show that the hypothesis of Lemma A.1 ensure that a consistent
belief can be constructed. This shows that, under the hypothesis of Lemma A.1, candidate
equilibria in which discretionary compensation is blocked cannot satisfy the PSE conditions.
Consider a candidate shareholder democracy equilibrium in which discretionary compen-
sation is blocked when the signal equals x2. The violation of the outrage constraint implies
that the shareholder belief associated with (x2,A+), δ ∗(x2,A+), satisfies δ ∗(x2,A+)> δ¯ . The
outrage constraint thus implies that (x2,A+) is off the equilibrium path. This belief is not
consistent in the sense of Grossman and Perry (1986) when defining a PSE: Because of the
outrage constraint, under this belief, the set of types that would weakly gain from defecting to
offering discretionary compensation is empty. Thus, the belief δ ∗(x2,A+) will satisfy the PSE
conditions if and only if no consistent belief can be assigned to (x2,A+).
We will now construct a consistent belief that can be assigned to (x2,A+). This requires
comparing the payoffs to the board in the candidate equilibrium with the board’s payoff under
a candidate consistent belief. As consistency requires that there is a positive probability that the
board will defect given the candidate consistent beliefs, the candidate consistent belief, if it is a
consistent belief, must not violate the outrage constraint at the off-equilibrium history (x2,A+).
We first consider board payoffs in the candidate equilibrium. In this equilibrium, discre-
tionary compensation is blocked by the outrage constraint. Thus, there is a unique feasible
action that maximizes the manager’s payoff when the manager is conflicted—rejecting the
project. Hence, in the candidate equilibrium, the MB will reject the project when the manager
is conflicted. When the manager is not conflicted, since paying discretionary compensation is
blocked, the MB will choose the action that minimizes suspicion. For this reason, it cannot be
the case that the MB, when the manager is not conflicted, is rejecting the project with probabil-
ity 1. If that were the case, the project would only be accepted by the SB, and suspicion would
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thus be minimized by accepting the project.
Thus, in the candidate equilibrium, when the manager is not conflicted, the MB is either
indifferent between accepting the project and rejecting the project, or the MB strictly prefers
to accept the project. In the first case, we call the equilibrium a “signal-jamming equilibrium”,
while in the second case, we call the equilibrium a “non signal-jamming equilibrium”. In signal
jamming equilibria, for reasons discussed in the proof of Proposition 4, the equilibrium assigns
the prior level of suspicion to both of the two on-the-equilibrium path histories, (x2,A−) and
(x2,R).
In non-signal jamming equilibria, when the manager is not conflicted, the MB will never
reject the project. We need to compute an upper bound on the suspicion in such equilibria asso-
ciated with rejection. To make this calculation, note that suspicion is maximized by minimizing
the probability that the SB rejects, i.e, maximizing the probability that the SB accepts. Share-
holder welfare considerations ensure that the SB cannot accept the project when the manager
is not conflicted and project is negative NPV. Because the state is G or M when signal x2 is
realized, and, in these states, the expected NPV of the project is non-negative, the SB can ac-
cept the project in these states when the manager is conflicted and discretionary compensation
is blocked. Thus, an upper bound on the level of suspicion is provided by the Bayes computa-
tion of the level of suspicion generated by the SB rejecting the project only when the manager
is not conflicted and project NPV being negative. We call this upper bound δ+ and call the












(1−β )(3−2θ) . (A-13)
These observation imply the following result:
Result 1
Suspicion in any equilibrium in which discretionary compensation is blocked satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) If the equilibrium is signal jamming, o∗(x2,R) = o∗(x2,A−) = δ/(1−δ ),
(b) If the equilibrium is not signal jamming, o∗(x2,R)≤ o+.
Now consider the following family of defection strategies indexed by σ ∈ [0,1]: (a) MB:
if the manager is not conflicted, defect to offering discretionary compensation. (b) SB: defect
to offering discretionary compensation if and only if the manager is conflicted. (c) MB: if the
manager is conflicted, defect to paying discretionary compensation with probability σ ∈ [0,1].
Based on manager (shareholder) welfare optimization, strategies (a) and (b) are always best re-
sponses provided the candidate consistent belief does not exceed the outrage threshold. (c) is a
best reply provided that σ = 0 whenever equilibrium suspicion is less than the candidate consis-
tent belief, and σ = 1 whenever equilibrium suspicion is greater than the candidate consistent
belief.
We call the odds that the manager is conflicted, produced by applying Bayes rule to defec-
tion strategy σ , od(σ). Note that defection strategy σ = 0 corresponds to the case where the
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signal is x2, the MB offers discretionary compensation if and only if the manager is not con-
flicted, and the SB offers discretionary compensation if and only if the manager is conflicted. A








Next, we compute od(1). These odds are generated by the σ = 1 defection strategy, the
strategy under which the MB always defects. The odds ratio for this strategy implied by Bayes
rule is given by
od(1) =
δ × 12

















(1−β )(3−2θ) . (A-16)
Inequality (A-16) can be verified by noting that od(1)− o+ is decreasing in both θ and β and
evaluated at the highest permitted values of these parameters, β = 1/3 and θ = 1, od(1)−o+ =
δ/(1−δ )> 0.
We now exhibit a consistent belief for (x2,A+). Constructing this belief requires us to show
that there exists a candidate consistent belief and σ ∈ [0,1] such that the σ -defection strategy is
an outrage feasible best response to the candidate consistent belief and the candidate consistent
belief equals the posterior level of suspicion produced by applying Bayes rule to the σ -defection
strategy. Managerial welfare is unaffected by defection when the manager is conflicted. So, in
this case, the MB’s defection decision is determined by reputational considerations alone, i.e.,
the level of suspicion associated with the defection strategy in comparison to the candidate
equilibrium strategy. In contrast, when (a) the board is SB or (b) the board is MB and the
manager is not conflicted, board best responses are only affected by the outrage threshold and
considerations of shareholder (manager) welfare. Thus, the defection decision is only sensitive
to the candidate consistent belief, provided this belief does not exceed the outrage threshold,
when the manager is conflicted and the board is MB. This implies that the key to establishing
belief consistency is verifying that, under the candidate consistent belief, the probability that
the MB defects, when the manager is conflicted, assigned by the σ -defection strategy is a best
response and produces the candidate consistent belief.
Next note that in the candidate equilibrium, in which discretionary compensation is blocked,
the unique optimal action for the MB when the manager is conflicted is to reject the project.
Thus, the MB’s defection decision will be based on a comparison of the suspicion associated
with rejecting the project in the candidate equilibrium and the suspicion associated with paying
discretionary compensation to the manager under the candidate consistent belief. We have two
cases to consider.
Case 1: suppose that either (1.a) the candidate equilibrium is a signal jamming equilibrium or
that (1.b) the candidate equilibrium is not a signal jamming equilibrium but o∗(x2,R)≤ od(0).
Let the candidate consistent belief assignment be δˆd(x2,A+) = od(0)/(1+ od(0)). In case
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1.a, Result 1.a, implies that o∗(x2,R) = δ/(1− δ ). Inspection of equation (A-14) shows that
od(0)> δ/(1−δ ), thus Result 1.a implies that o∗(x2,R)< od(0). In case 1.b, o∗(x2,R)≤ od(0)
by assumption. Thus, in both cases, under the candidate consistent belief, defections which
lead to (x2,A+) produce a weakly higher level of suspicion than the unique optimal action in
the candidate equilibrium for the MB when the manager is conflicted—reject the project. The
hypothesis of the Lemma A.1 and equation (A-14) show that the suspicion associated with
od(0) is not sufficient to violate the outrage constraint. Thus, the conditions for the defection
strategy σ = 0 being a best response to the candidate consistent belief, δˆd(x2,A+), are satisfied.
The posterior suspicion generated by this defection strategy under Bayes rule equals δˆd(x2,A+)
by construction. Thus, the candidate consistent belief is consistent.
Case 2: suppose that o∗(x2,R) > od(0) and the equilibrium is not signal-jamming. In this
case, as shown by Result 1.b and inequality (A-16), o∗(x2,R) ≤ o+ < od(1). Hence, od(0) <
o∗(x2,R) < od(1). Because, σ ↪→ od(σ) is continuous, from the intermediate value theorem
it follows that there exists σo ∈ (0,1) such that od(σo) = o∗(x2,R). Let the candidate con-
sistent belief assignment be δˆd(x2,A+) = od(σo)/(1+ od(σo)). Because od(σo) = o∗(x2,R),
δˆd(x2,A+) = δ ∗(x2,R) and because the history of rejecting the project is reached in the can-
didate equilibrium, δ ∗(x2,R) does not violate the outrage constraint. Because δˆd(x2,A+) =
δ ∗(x2,R), δˆd(x2,A+) does not violate the outrage constraint either. Thus, the suspicion asso-
ciated with rejecting the project in the candidate equilibrium equals the suspicion associated
with defection. Since, the MB’s unique optimal action in the candidate equilibrium when the
manager is conflicted is to reject the project, and since defection has no effect on the man-
ager’s payoff, when the manager is conflicted the MB is indifferent to defection. Thus, the
conditions for the defection strategy σ = σo being a best response to the candidate consistent
belief, δˆd(x2,A+) are satisfied. The posterior suspicion generated by this defection strategy
under Bayes rule equals δˆd(x2,A+) by construction. Thus, the candidate consistent belief is
consistent.
Given Lemma A.1, the proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward: As noted in the proof of
Lemma A.1, the hypothesis of the lemma is equivalent to o(x2,A+)≤ δ¯/(1− δ¯ ), where o(x2,A+)
is the odds ratio associated with paying discretionary compensation under signal x2 when
discretionary compensation is not blocked by outrage.16 When discretionary compensation
is not blocked after signal x1, the odds ratio for the board being disloyal must not produce
a violation of the outrage constraint, i.e, o(x1,A+) ≤ δ¯/(1− δ¯ ).17 Proposition 5 shows that
o(x2,A+) < o(x1,A+). Thus, if o(x1,A+) ≤ δ¯/(1− δ¯ ), o(x2,A+) ≤ δ¯/(1− δ¯ ). This implies
that the hypothesis of Lemma A.1 is verified. Hence, discretionary compensation not blocked
in any equilibrium after signal x2.
Proof of Proposition 6. Our proof of Proposition 6 faces one obstacle—the parameter space is
constrained by the non-linear constraint provided by inequality (1). To surmount this obstacle
16See equation (A-7) in the proof of Proposition 3 for the definition of o(x2,A+).
17See equation (A-10) in the proof of Proposition 4 for the definition of o(x1,A+).
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we reparameterize the model using the following 1-1 transformation of (θ ,P) into two new




, ζ = P
θ
1−θ . (A-17)
Note that this map (θ ,P) ↪→ (r,ζ ) maps all parameter choices for (θ ,P) which satisfy condition
(1) as well as the conditions that P > 0 and θ ∈ (12 ,1) 1-1 onto the unit square, (0,1)2. Because
assumption (1) places no restriction on the other parameters, reparameterization represents the
admissible parameter space as a hypercube. We will use this parameterization in parts of the
proof where it helps with the derivations.
In addition to the reparameterization, the proof of Proposition 6 requires the following tech-
nical lemma.
Lemma A.2. The set of shareholder prior assessments under which shareholder democracy
dominates the two ex ante policies, CR and FD is an interior interval of [0,1] defined as follows:
{δ ∈ [0,1] : uDSh−uCRSh ≥ 0 & uDSh−uFDSh ≥ 0}=














Proof. Note the probability that the board is MB equals δ .The ex ante payoff to shareholders
under democracy, uD, is the weighted average of their ex ante payoffs under an MB and an SB.
Taking expectations over the signal contingent payoffs under democracy provided by Table 4
we can determine the ex ante payoff from democracy for each board type:










(4(1−β )+β ((1−P)(2θ +1))).
(A-20)
The comparable expressions for ex ante payoffs under FD and CR are provided in Section 2.4.
Computing the difference between shareholder payoffs under democracy and under the two ex


































We see that these difference functions are affine in δ ; thus the set of values of δ ∈ [0,1]
that satisfy both uDSh− uCRSh ≥ 0 and DSh− uFDSh ≥ 0 is the intersection of two convex subsets of
[0,1]. Thus the set is either empty or an interval. ACR < 0 and this subset cannot contain 1
and BFD < 0 so the subset cannot contain 0. Explicitly computing the endpoints of this interval
provides expressions (A-18) and (A-19).
First note that part (a) follows from the argument given in the text following the Proposition.
Next note that part (b) follows simply from expression (A-19), which implies that δ+ < β .
Because democratic governance is never optimal for δ > δ+, part (b) follows. Now consider
part (c). Under the reparameterization defined by equation (A-17) we can write the lower and
upper limits of the region were democracy is optimal as follows:
d− =
(1+3r)β (1− rζ )




1+3r (1−ζ )− r2 ζ )
1+3r+ r (4+ r (4−5β )−7β )ζ . (A-24)
Under our parametric assumptions, the numerators and denominators of these expressions are
positive. Also note that,
Numerator[d−]−Numerator[d+] = 2(1− r)rβζ > 0. (A-25)
The range of prior probabilities over which democracy is optimal is empty if d+ < d−. Expres-
sion (A-25) shows that the numerator of d− is always greater than the numerator of d+. Thus, a
sufficient condition for d+ < d− is that the denominator of d− be smaller than the denominator




((1− r)−β (3+ r)
)
+2ζ rβ (r−3). (A-26)
The second term is clearly negative, and the first one is negative if 3+r1−r >
1
β , which is equivalent
to θ − 12 < β1−β . The expression in the Proposition is just the translation back to the (β ,θ)
parameterization.
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